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HOME RULE WETLANDS PROTECTION IN 
MASSACHUSETTS: LOVEQUIST V. CONSERVATION 
COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF DENNIS 
Kevin W. Brown* 
I. Introduction 
Wetlands are low-lying land areas, usually adjacent to bodies of 
water, where the ground water table approaches the land surface. 
Wetlands may be classified as such by soil type, plant life, or the 
high water mark. l In common terms, they include swamps, bogs, 
and salt or freshwater marshes. The ecological significance of wet-
lands in the United States and throughout the world has only re-
cently been recognized. Wetlands have been shown to play an im-
portant role in flood prevention, the maintenance of the ground 
water table, the filtration of pollution, and the nourishment of fish 
and wildlife. lI 
The recognition of the value of wetlands has come at a time 
when, particularly in coastal areas, they are rapidly being de-
stroyed. Population pressures have led to increased dredging and 
filling of wetlands to provide more space for residential and com-
mercial use. Legislative efforts to halt the overdevelopment of the 
nation's wetlands have, not surprisingly, raised a myriad of legal 
questions, some of which will be examined in this article.8 
• Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 For a discussion of statutory problems in defining wetlands and a general discussion of 
the New York Freshwater Wetlands Act, see Comment, The Freshwater Wetlands Act: Per-
missive Regulation vs. Constructive Taking, 43 ALB. L. REV. 295 (1979). 
• See generally J. TEAL & M. TEAL, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A SALT MARSH (1969). 
S This article does not discuss the often-litigated issue of whether an unconstitutional 
taking has occurred. See: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Turnpike 
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Concern about wetlands development has led to efforts at all 
levels of government to curb the rate of wetlands destruction.· The 
federal government possesses considerable jurisdiction in the field 
due to its broadly interpreted control of navigable waters. Ii It has 
exercised its authority through several statutes, most notably the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,' the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act of 1972,7 and the Coastal Zone Management Act.' How-
ever, the development of wetlands is predominantly a property is-
sue and as such lies within the traditional purview of state police 
powers. For this reason, responsibility for the regulation of wet-
lands development has fallen largely to the states.9 The federal 
government has encouraged state action particularly through the 
Coastal Zone Management Act which provides funding to ap-
proved state coastal management programs. 10 
Approaches to wetlands protection vary from state to state. 
Many states leave the issue to local zoning by-laws and ordi-
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1108 (1973); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 
N.E.2d 666 (1965); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 
761 (1972); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Dawson, Pro-
tecting Massachusetts Wetlands, 12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 755 (1978). 
• See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wisc.2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Massachusetts 
Wetlands Protection Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980); Exec. 
Order No. 11,990, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West Supp. 1979); 
G. McGregor & A. Dawson, Wetlands and Floodplain Protection, 64 MASS. L. REv. 73 
(1979). 
• See United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); 
NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975). 
• 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-467e (West Supp. 1980). This act regulates construction and dump-
ing in navigable waters. See generally, Myhrum, Federal Protection of Wetlands through 
Legal Process, 7 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 567, 579-88 (1979). 
• 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1980). Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1978) establishes a permit system for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters. For a copacetic analysis of Section 
404, see Myhrum, Federal Protection of Wetlands through Legal Process, 7 B.C. ENV. AFr. 
L. REV. 567 (1979). 
• 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West Supp. 1980). This act funds federally approved state 
programs which monitor and coordinate coastal development. Hildreth, The Operation of 
the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act as Amended, 10 NAT. RES. L. 211 (1977). Shaf-
fer, O.C.S. Development and the Consistency Provisions of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act-A Legal and Policy Analysis, 4 OHIO NORTH. L. REV. 595 (1977). 
• Some commentators have expressed concern that federal environmental regulation as 
interpreted by the courts interferes more than is necessary in areas of traditional state inter-
est. See Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified Method 
of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1978). 
10 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455 (West Supp. 1980). 
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nances.ll Several states, including Massachusetts, have enacted 
comprehensive wetlands protection statutes which regulate the de-
velopment of wetlands throughout the state. II The Massachusetts 
Wetlands Protection Actll prohibits the alteration of wetlands 
without a permit from a locally appointed conservation commis-
sion. Towns and cities in Massachusetts also possess authority to 
regulate wetlands development through their zoning powersl4 and, 
to some extent, under the state earth removal statute. II 
The adoption of home rule by Massachusettsl • and many other 
states has raised the intriguing possibility of the use of a new ap-
proach to wetlands protection at the local level. This approach in-
volves the use of independent municipal powers, apart from state 
zoning and wetlands protection systems, to enact local wetlands 
by-laws and ordinances.17 The use of home rule powers for envi-
ronmental protection and other purposes has met with a narrow 
judicial interpretation in some stateS.18 It is in the light of such 
restrictive views that the recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
11 For a seminal discussion of the use of zoning for the closely-related purpose of flood 
control, see Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959). 
,. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. II 22a-28 to 22a-45 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6601-6620 (1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-2401 to 43-2413 (1978); ME. REv. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 471-478 (Supp. 1980); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 9-501 
(Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. cbs. 130 § 105,131 §§ 40, 40A (West Supp. 1980); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-1 to 9A-10 (West 1979); N.Y. ENVlR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to 24-
0303, 25-0101 to 25-0601 (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-229 to 113-230 
(Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAW. § 11-46.1-1 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 62.1-13.1 to 62.1-13.20 
(Supp. 1980). 
,. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980). 
If Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970). 
11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21(17) (West Supp. 1980). 
,. MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX. 
I. See Pierce, Home Rule and Municipal Environmental Regulation in Kansas, 26 KAN. 
L. REV. 535 (1978). 
,. Comment, State and Municipal Government: Home Rule, 14 ANN. SURVEY MAss. LAW 
264 (1967). But see Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role 
for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964), for the proposition that home rule authoriza-
tions have not in fact been strictly construed. 
A notable example of the narrow construction of home rule may be found in Illinois where 
the courts have interpreted the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
ll1Y2, §§ 1001-1045 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980), City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 
65 Ill.2d 1,357 N.E.2d 433 (1976); Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines, 63 
Ill.2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976) 88 pre-empting any home rule environmental protection. 
This position has been strongly criticized by commentators. See Minetz, Recent Illinois Su-
preme Court Decisions Concerning the Authority of Home Rule Units to Control Local 
Environmental Problems, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 306 (1977); Bornstein, Sanitary Landfill Per-
mits in Illinois: State Preemption of Home Rule Zoning Powers, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 353 
(1977). 
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Court decision in Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of the 
Town of Dennis19 takes on considerable importance. In that case 
the court considered the question of a town's ability to enact a 
wetlands protection by-law under its home rule powers. The court 
decided that neither the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act20 nor 
the Wetlands Protection Act preempted the field of wetlands regu-
lation from local home rule enactments. This decision has cleared 
a new path for municipal regulation of wetlands development in 
Massachusetts. 
This article will explore the power of Massachusetts municipal-
ities to regulate wetlands development in light of the Lovequist 
decision. First, it will examine municipal authority to regulate 
wetlands through the statutory authorizations of the Wetlands 
Protection Act, the Zoning Enabling Act, and the state earth re-
moval statute. Second, it will discuss the adoption and judicial in-
terpretation of home rule in Massachusetts. Finally, it will examine 
the application of home rule principles to wetlands protection in 
the Lovequist case and explore the probable significance of this de-
cision both in Massachusetts and in other states. 
II. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL WETLANDS 
PROTECTION 
A. The Wetlands Protection Act 
The Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act was enacted in 
1972.21 It employs a permit system under which no person may "al-
ter" a wetland without a permit from the local conservation com-
mission. Commissions are appointed by the mayor or board of 
selectmen of each municipality. Members serve three-year terms.1i 
Under the Wetlands Protection Act, any person wishing to fill, 
dredge, or alter a wetland in Massachusetts must file a notice of 
intent with the local conservation commission. The commission 
must hold a public hearing on the proposal within twenty-one 
days. Following the hearing, the commission is required to deter-
mine whether the area in which the work is to be done is "signifi-
.8 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 393 N.E.2d 858 (1979). For the sake of brevity, this case will be 
refened to in text and notes as Lovequist v. Town of Dennis. 
I. Act of May 3, 1954, ch. 368, 1954 Mass. Acts 244. 
II Act of July 18, 1972, ch. 784, 1972 Mass. Acts 744 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980». 
II MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 8C (West Supp. 1980). 
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cant" to any of the following wetlands values: (1) public or private 
water supply; (2) ground water supply; (3) flood control; (4) storm 
damage prevention; (5) prevention of pollution; (6) protection of 
land containing shellfish; and (7) protection of fisheries. sa If the 
commission determines, based on evidence presented at the hear-
ing, that the wetland which the applicant proposes to alter is sig-
nificant to one or more of these interests, it is required to impose, 
through an "order of conditions," such "conditions"l. on the pro-
posed alteration as the commission finds necessary to protect the 
significant wetlands interests involved.15 
Local conservation commissions have broad discretion in making 
their findings and imposing conditions. However, a de novo16 ap-
peal from a commission's decision or failure to act is available in 
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engi-
neering (DEQE).17 Under the de novo standard of review, the 
DEQE may make its own fact determinations as well as applying 
its own interpretation of the Act to those facts. Because the DEQE 
review is de novo, the state agency has ample authority with which 
to overrule local decisions. From a municipal point of view this su-
perseding state authority may present a major drawback to reli-
ance on the Wetlands Protection Act for the regulation of local 
wetlands. IS Cities and towns which wish to exercise greater local 
control over wetlands regulation must look to other statutory 
authorizations . 
•• MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980) . 
.. Id. The statute does not expressly grant local commissions the power to prohibit 
development. 
··Id . 
.. "Hearing de novo" has been defined as "a new hearing or a hearing for a second time, 
contemplating an entire trial in the same manner in which ... [the) ... matter was origi-
nally heard and a review of ... [the) .•. previous hearing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 649 
(5th ed. 1979). The Wetlands Protection Act does not expressly provide for a de novo appeal 
to the DEQE, but this is the generally accepted interpretation of the statute. DAWSON & 
MCGREGGOR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1978). The Act provides that, upon appropriate request, 
"[T)he department shall make the determination" of whether the alteration proposed would 
significantly affect the wetlands interests listed. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 
Supp. 1980) . 
•• MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980) . 
.. It is difficult to obtain current statistics on the implementation of the Wetlands Protec-
tion Act. In the past, it has been estimated that 10 percent of the Orders of Conditions 
issued by the local conservation commissions were superseded by DEQE orders. OFFICE OF 
COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND FINAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 164 (1978). 
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B. The Zoning Act 
A second avenue for wetlands regulation which places more au-
thority in the municipality than does the Wetlands Protection Act 
is the Massachusetts zoning statute. The present zoning law, enti-
tled the Zoning Act, was enacted in 197518 and replaced the Zoning 
Enabling Act. ao Both acts set out procedures for municipalities to 
follow in order to adopt or alter zoning by-laws and ordinances. 
They also outline purposes for which zoning by-laws and ordi-
nances can be enacted. al 
The Zoning Enabling Act allowed municipalities to pass zoning 
by-laws regulating land use "for the purpose of promoting the 
health, safety, convenience, morals, or welfare"aa of their residents, 
and expressly allowed that: "A zoning ordinance or by-law may 
provide that lands deemed subject to seasonal or periodic flooding 
shall not be used for residence or other purposes in such a manner 
as to endanger the health or safety of the occupants' thereof. "aa 
Numerous wetlands decisions were reached under this statute." 
In Golden v. Board 0/ Selectmen 0/ Falmouth, al the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court determined that local regulation of 
wetlands development was authorized by the Zoning Enabling Act. 
The court held that the then-existing wetlands statute" which reg-
ulated the filling and dredging of coastal wetlands was not in-
tended to preclude municipalities from enacting more stringent 
regulations under their zoning powers. Specifically, under the old 
state statute a person desiring to dredge or fill coastal wetlands 
was required to file a notice of intent with the Director of Marine 
Fisheries who was then empowered to issue an "order of condi-
tions" similar to that in the present Wetlands Protection Act.a., 
The town of Falmouth passed a zoning by-law which required a 
local zoning permit in addition to the authorization of the Marine 
Fisheries Director. The plaintiff in Golden, after receiving an order 
.. Act of Dec. 22, 1975, ch. 808, 1975 Mass. Acts 1112 (current veraion at MAss. GEN. 
LAws ANN. ch. 4OA, II 1-17 (Weat 1979». 
10 Act of May 3, 1954, ch. 368, 1954 Mass. Acts 244 . 
• , [d. I 2; Act of Dec. 22, 1975, ch. 808, I 2A, 1975 Mass. Acts 1112, 1114. 
U Act of May 3, 1954, ch. 368, I 2, 1954 Mass. Acts 244 . 
.. [d . 
.. See Dawson, Protecting MU8tJchusett8 Wetlands, 12 SUFFOLK L. REv. 756 (1978). 
.. 358 Mass. 519, 265 N.E.2d 573 (1970) . 
.. The Jonea Act, Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 426, 1963 Mass. Acts 240 (repealed in 1972 
with the passage of the Wetlands Protection Act) . 
.. [d. 
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of conditions from the director, was refused the local permit and 
therefore challenged the validity of the by-law. The court upheld 
the by-law as a legitimate exercise of municipal zoning power. It 
decided that under the Zoning Enabling Act municipalities could 
enact wetlands by-laws and ordinances parallel to the state wet-
lands regulations and thus strengthen the protection of local 
wetlands. 88 
The substantive limits to the use of zoning for wetlands protec-
tion were examined in Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham,88 where 
the court addressed the validity of a zoning by-law which created a 
flood plain district in which construction was forbidden without a 
permit. The by-law had four stated purposes: (1) the preservation 
of the ground water table; (2) the promotion of public health and 
safety by protecting persons and property from flooding; (3) the 
protection of the community from the costs which may be incurred 
due to building in unsuitable, flood-prone areas; and (4) the con-
servation of natural conditions, wildlife, and open· space for public 
education, recreation and general welfare!O 
The court found that the first three purposes promoted the gen-
eral welfare and were therefore within the authority granted by the 
Zoning Enabling Act!1 The fourth purpose, however, the court 
classified· as "aesthetic considerations" which "may not be disre-
garded in determining the validity of a zoning by-law, but ... 
[which] ... do not alone justify restrictions upon private property 
.... " •• The court upheld the by-law on the basis of the first three 
stated purposes, and treated aesthetics as an ancillary purpose 
which would not defeat an otherwise valid by-law!8 
The Supreme Judicial Court's unwillingness to uphold zoning 
by-laws based on aesthetic considerations alone can also be seen in 
.. Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 523, 165 N.E.2d 573, 576 
(1970) . 
.. 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973) . 
•• [d. at 227, 284 N.E.2d at 895-96 • 
• , [d. at 229, 284 N.E.2d at 896. See Dunham, Flood Control via the Police Power, 107 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959) . 
•• Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 229, 284 N.E.2d 891, 896 
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). See Barney and Carey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 
Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949); but see Donnelly v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 369 Mass. 
206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975), where the Supreme Judicial Court found that in the context of 
outdoor advertising, aesthetics alone may be a permissible legislative purpose under both 
the state police power and the Zoning Enabling Act. 
.. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 229, 284 N.E.2d 891, 896 
(1972). 
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MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury."" In that case, the 
town passed a zoning by-law which required a permit for wetlands 
development. The plaintiffs were denied a permit to excavate and 
fill some coastal lots which they owned. They claimed that the 
town was arbitrarily refusing to grant permits in order to perserve 
the waterfront in its natural state. The court held that "[t]he pres-
ervation of privately owned land in its natural, unspoiled state for 
the enjoyment and benefit of the public by preventing the owner 
from using it for any practical purpose is not within the scope and 
limits of any power or authority delegated to municpalities under 
the Zoning Enabling Act."41 
As can be seen from the Golden, Turnpike, and MacGibbon de-
cisions, the Zoning Enabling Act gave municipalities substantial, 
although not unlimited powers to regulate wetlands development. 
These powers were continued if not expanded by the new Zoning 
Act. '" Insofar as it affects wetlands, the major difference between 
the two statutes is the expansion in the Zoning Act of the expressly 
stated purposes for which a town or city may zone."7 The Zoning 
Act explicitly allows the zoning objectives of pollution prevention, 
regulation of flood plains and wetlands to encourage most appro-
priate use, the provision for open spaces, and "the development of 
the natural, scenic and aesthetic qualities of the community.""· 
The long-term significance of these changes is not yet evident. 
Many of the zoning purposes expressly stated in the Zoning Act 
can be, and have been construed to fall within the public welfare 
•• MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mase. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964) 
(MacGibbon I)i MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury 356 Mase. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 
(1970) (MacGibbon II); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mase. 512, 340 
N.E.2d 487 (1976), rehearing denied, 369 Mase. 523, 344 N.E.2d 185 (1976) (MacGibbon 
III). The discussion here does not attempt to cover all of the arguments raised in the com-
plex MacGibbon litigation, which lasted approximately twelve years. For a detailed analysis 
of MacGibbon and a discussion of wetlands zoning cases in Maseachusetts, see Dawson, Pro-
tecting Massachusetts Wetlands, 12 SUPJ'OLK L. REv. 755 (1978) . 
•• MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mase. 635, 640-41, 255 N.E.2d 347, 
351 (1970) (MacGibbon II) . 
•• Act of Dec. 22, 1975, ch. 808, 1975 Mase. Acts 1112 (current version at MAss. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (West 1979» • 
•• Id. § 2A at 1114, reprinted in note, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, § 1 (West 1979). 
The Zoning Act also expressly forbids a zoning ordinance or by-law to exempt land or build-
ings from floodplain or wetlands regulations established pursuant to general law. MAss. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 3 (West 1979) • 
.. Act of Dec. 22, 1975, ch. 808, § 2A, 1975 Mase. Acts 1112, 1114, reprinted in note MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 1 (West 1979). 
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standard employed by the Zoning Enabling Act.48 However, the 
Zoning Act does clarify the intent of the state legislature to pro-
mote wetlands zoning regulations, and it may force the court to 
base future decisions on constitutional rather than statutory 
grounds. For example, if the MacGibbon case had been decided 
under the Zoning Act, the court could not have held that the Dux-
bury by-law went beyond the purposes authorized by the Act. In-
stead, it would have been forced to decide the case on the constitu-
tional issue of taking without due process of law.lIo 
Although substantively Massachusetts municipalities have broad 
authority to zone for wetlands protection, the use of zoning 
presents numerous procedural obstacles. Briefly, the procedure for 
adoption or alteration of zoning by-laws under the Zoning Act is as 
follows. III A zoning proposal must be submitted to the city council 
or board of selectmen which will forward it to the local planning 
board. The planning board, after complying with the substantial 
notice requirements in the Zoning Act,1II holds a public hearing on 
the proposal and then submits its report to the city council or town 
meeting. There the proposal must be passed by a two-thirds major-
ity vote. A zoning proposal which does not receive the necessary 
two-thirds vote may not be considered again for two years unless it 
has received a favorable report from the planning board. Finally, 
both zoning and non-zoning town by-laws require the approval of 
the state attorney general.lla 
Besides the precise notice requirements and the need for a two-
thirds majority vote for adoption, zoning by-laws have two major 
post-enactment procedural limitations which non-zoning by-laws 
may circumvent. First, the Zoning Act provides exemptions from 
zoning by-laws and ordinances for those who can prove prior non-
conforming uses of their property." Although non-zoning by-laws 
may not ban pre-existing uses outright, they can be employed to 
minimize the effects of such uses.1II Second, the Act constructs a 
•• See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 227-28, 284 N.E.2d 891, 
896 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police 
Power, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; see notes 3 and 44 supra. 
"' MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 5 (West 1979). 
I. Id . 
.. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 32 (West Supp. 1980). City ordinances do not require 
the attorney general's approval . 
.. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4OA, § 6 (West 1979). 
II For a discussion of means to minimize prior non-conforming use requirements through 
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special appeal process through a local zoning board of appeals." 
Applicants who have been denied permits first seek review from 
the board of appeals which may grant special· permits or variances. 
Then, if turned down by the board of appeals, an applicant can 
still obtain a broad de novo review in Superior COurt.57 Under non-
zoning ordinances and by-laws, appeal is directly to the Superior 
Court under the narrower standards of certiorari review. 58 
c. The Earth Removal Statute 
Given the complex procedure required to enact and enforce zon-
ing by-laws and ordinances, it is usually to the advantage of a Mas-
sachusetts municipality to act through non-zoning powers. Apart 
from home rule powers·· this means that the municipality must act 
under a different statutory authorization from the state legislature. 
In the context of wetlands protection the most important statutory 
authorization other than the Wetlands Protection and Zoning Acts 
is the state earth removal statute.eo The earth removal statute au-
thorizes towns to enact by-laws "not repugnant to law,,.1 regulat-
ing or prohibiting the removal of soil, loam, sand or gravel from 
private land in the whole town or specified districts. e. The courts 
have held that the earth removal statute is an authorization sepa-
rate from the state zoning scheme, e. that under its authority towns 
can regulate earth removal without following the zoning proce-
dures," and that a town may employ both zoning by-laws and non-
zoning earth removal by-laws simultaneously.e. 
These decisions demonstrate that the Massachusetts courts are 
the earth removal authorization, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21(17) (West Supp. 1980), 
aee Dawson, Earth Removal and Environmental Protection, 3 ENV. An. 166, 171-72 (1974) . 
.. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §§ 12, 14 (West 1979) . 
•• Id. § 17 . 
.. In Massachusetts, certiorari is authorized by MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 249, § 4 (West 
Supp. 1980). This procedure provides for review of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings 
where the aggrieved party has no other reasonably adequate remedy and has suffered a 
substantial injury or injustice from the proceeding under review. See Boston Edison Co. v. 
Board of Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 242 N.E.2d 868 (1968). 
II See text at notes 68-97 infra. 
eo MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21(17) (West Supp. 1980). See Dawson, Earth Removal 
and Environmental Protection, 3 ENV. APr. 166 (1974). 
II MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West Supp. 1980). 
II Id. § 21(17). 
II Byrne v. Town of Middleborough, 364 Mass. 331, 304 N.E.2d 194 (1973) . 
.. Id . 
.. Goodwin v. Hopkinton, 358 Mass. 164,261 N.E.2d 60 (1970). See note 144 infra. 
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willing to uphold some municipal land-use regulation apart from 
the zoning power. However, regulation of wetlands development is 
only partly possible through the earth removal statute because the 
statute is a substantively narrow authorization. It empowers local 
regulation of earth removal only in order to minimize harms rea-
sonably related to earth removal.88 While these may include depre-
ciation of land values, noise, dust, erosion, or even water pollu-
tion,'7 the statute could not be stretched, for example, to cover the 
filling of a wetland. 
This discussion of the Wetlands Protection Act, the Zoning Act, 
and the earth removal statute should indicate that although Mas-
sachusetts municipalities have a broad choice in the way that they 
can approach regulating the development of local wetlands, each of 
the possible means has its drawbacks. Action by local conservation 
commissions under the Wetlands Protection Act can be overruled 
by the state DEQE. The Zoning Act gives substantial local power 
but is procedurally demanding. The earth removal statute, con-
versely, is procedurally simple but substantively narrow. Yet, at 
least one alternative to these means is available: the use of munici-
pal home rule powers. 
III. MUNICIPAL POWER UNDER HOME RULE 
Home rule, which in one form or another has been adopted by a 
majority of the states," is based on the concept that municipalities 
have or ought to have inherent power to legislate on local matters. 
Home rule thus reverses the longstanding presumption of "Dillon's 
Rule"" that a municipal corporation possesses only those powers 
expressly granted to it, those necessarily or fairly implied from the 
powers expressly granted, and those powers essential to the de-
clared purposes of the corporation.70 Thus, under home rule, in-
.. See Beard v. Town of Salisbury, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1703, 392 N.E.2d 832 (1979). 
'7 See Dawson, Earth Removal and Environmental Protection, 3 ENV. AFF. 166,176, 180 
(1974) . 
.. See LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT RELATIVE TO MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 
MASS. SENATE REP. No. 580 (1961) . 
• t DILLON, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 at 449-50 (5th ed. 1911). 
7. Id. See Del Duca v. Town Administrator of Methuen, 368 Mass. I, 10,329 N.E.2d 748, 
754 (1975). The home rule system adopted by some states goes beyond giving a presumption 
of validity to local enactments and creates a sphere of municipal jurisdiction in local mat-
ters within which a home rule unit can legislate to the exclusion of the state. See, e.g. CAL. 
CONST. art. XI, § 5. This article deals primarily with the form of home rule adopted in 
Massachusetts. See note 71 infra. 
" 
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stead of the state legislature having to authorize a municipality to 
enact by-laws or ordinances on a subject, the presumption is 
shifted to allow municipalities to take action on local matters un-
less specifically prohibited by the state. 
Massachusetts towns and cities received home rule powers in 
1966 with the adoption of Article 89 of the amendments to the 
state constitution.71 Section 6 of Article 89 granted to towns and 
cities the ability, through the adoption of local by-laws and ordi-
nances, to "exercise any power or function which the [state legisla-
ture] has power to confer upon [them] which is not inconsistent 
with the constitution or laws enacted by the [legislature] .... "'11 
Thus, municipalities were granted broad police powers which were 
limited by the requirements that the subject matter of the by-laws 
and ordinances be local, 'IS that they be not inconsistent with the 
state constitution or state statutes, and that they not infringe on 
powers expressly reserved by other sections of the amendment or 
prohibited to a town by its charter. 'I. 
Article 89's requirement that municipal by-laws and ordinances 
be not inconsistent with state law'lll amounts to a major reservation 
of power in the state legislature. When considered along with the 
power of the legislature to pass, by a two-thirds majority, "special" 
.. MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43B (West Supp. 
1980). See Comment, State and Municipal Government: Home Rule, 14 ANN. SURVEY MASS. 
LAW 264 (1967). For a discussion of environmental protection under home rule in Kansas, 
see Pierce, Home Rule and Municipal Environmental Regulation in Kansas, 26 KAN. L. 
REV. 535 (1978). 
T' MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 6. The full text is as follows: 
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or 
by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general court has power to confer 
upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general 
court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court by section eight, and which 
is not denied, either expressly or by clear implication, to the city or town by its charter. 
This section shall apply to every city and town, whether or not it has adopted a charter 
pursuant to section three. 
T. Id. The requirement that home rule enactments be limited to "local" matters has been 
subject to different judicial interpretations. Compare Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 
136, 148, 293 N.E.2d 268, 276 (1973) with City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 65 Ill. 
2d 1, 5, 357 N.E.2d 433, 435 (1976). 
T' MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, §§ 6, 7. Section seven states that cities and towns 
are not granted the power to regulate certain elections, levy or collect taxes, borrow money, 
dispose of parkland, enact laws governing civil relationships "except as an incident to an 
exercise of independent municipal power," define felonies, or impose imprisonment in 
punishment for a violation of any law. 
TO MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 6. 
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laws which pertain to a single city or town,76 it may be seen that 
this reservation in the state amounts to a veto power over local by-
laws and ordinances. For example, if a town or towns passed by-
laws regulating a subject that the legislature felt was inappropriate 
for local regulation, the legislature could pass a law pre-empting 
the field from local enactments. 
Although at first glance this veto power in the state legislature 
may appear to cripple home rule in Massachusetts, the ultimate 
retention of power at the state level, as some commentators have 
pointed out,77 may have proved to be a blessing in disguise. The 
judiciaries of some other home rule states, fearful of granting too 
much power to local governments, have taken a restrictive view of 
home rule powers.78 Typically, municipal authority has been lim-
ited by a narrow judicial view of what topics are in fact "local" and 
therefore subject to home rule regulation.79 Alternatively, where a 
state's home rule plan provides for pre-emption of local powers by 
state legislation, the judiciary can narrow local authority through 
its interpretation of legislative intent to pre-empt.80 In Massachu-
setts, perhaps because of the clear retention of power at the state 
level, home rule enactments have received predominantly favorable 
treatment from the state courts. 
The leading Massachusetts decision which announced standards 
.. [d. § 8. 
77 Comment, State and Municipal Government: Home Rule, 14 ANN. SURVEY MASS. LAW 
264, 277 (1967). 
7. See, e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 65 Ill.2d I, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976); 
Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill.2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716 (1976); 
Salzman v. Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953); Newport Amusement Co. v. 
Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 166 A.2d 216 (1960); Bornstein, Sanitary Landfill Permits in Illinois: 
State Pre-emption of Home Rule Zoning Powers, 8 Loy. CHI. L. J. 353 (1977); Comment, 
Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1148-49 (1966); 
Minetz, Recent Illinois Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Authority of Home Rule 
Units to Control Environmental Problems, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 306 (1977). But see 
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964). 
7. For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. 
Ry., 65 Ill.2d I, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976), determined that noise pollution was "not an environ-
mental problem of local concern" because noise can cross municipal boundaries. [d. at 7, 357 
N.E.2d at 436. By adopting such positions, courts can practically eliminate home rule au-
thority. However, if there is any issue that truly is local, it is a property issue. Home rule 
provisions often create express local authority to act on "property" matters. See, e.g., N.Y. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2(c). Wetlands ordinances and by-laws should at least pass the test of 
being "local" enactments. Yet, this is only the first hurdle. Local wetlands enactments can 
still be interpreted as being inconsistent with or pre-empted by state law and, therefore, 
void . 
.. See City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 65 Ill.2d I, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976). 
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for determining the existence of an inconsistency between state 
law and local by-laws and ordinances is Bloom v. City of Worces-
ter. l ! The issue in that case was the validity of a city ordinance 
that conferred subpoena powers on a local human rights commis-
sion. It was argued that the ordinance was inconsistent with the 
state Human Rights Actl' and with Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 233, section 8 which granted subpoena powers to some lo-
cal agencies but did not mention local human rights commissions.18 
The court, after deciding that human rights was a local as well as a 
state issue, considered what standard of "inconsistency" to adopt 
for home rule enactments. It analogized the situation to federal 
pre-emption cases where the existence of a federal statute on a 
subject may preclude state regulation of the same subject" and to 
state statutes such as the earth removal authorization which allow 
local action only if "not repugnant to law. "1& The court, concluding 
that the "inconsistency" standard to be used in home rule cases 
should be substantially the same as in these other pre-emption sit-
uations, held that "[t]he legislative intent to preclude local action 
must be clear."" The court noted that the intent to pre-empt may 
be inferred from comprehensive state legislation on a subject mat-
ter or by an explicit limitation in the way cities and towns may act 
on that subject, but the court made it apparent that it would not 
infer state intent to occupy a field of legislation whenever the state 
legislature acted on a subject. "If the State legislative purpose can 
be achieved in the face of a local ordinance or by-law on the same 
subject, the local ordinance or by-law is not inconsistent with the 
State legislation, unless the Legislature has expressly forbidden the 
adoption of local ordinances and by-laws on that subject."·" 
Since there was no apparent legislative intent behind the 
Human Rights Act to preclude local actions on the same subject 
matter, the court considered whether the Worcester ordinance 
frustrated the achievement of any statutory purpose. It determined 
that neither the existence of the local human rights commission 
I. 363 Mass. 136, 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973). 
IS MAss. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B (West Supp. 1980). 
IS Id. ch. 233, § 8 . 
.. See Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified Method 
of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1978). 
II MAss. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West Supp. 1980); Commonwealth v. Baronas, 285 
Mass. 321, 322, 189 N.E. 62, 63 (1934) . 
.. Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 155, 293 N.E.2d 268, 280 (1973) . 
.., Id. at 156, 293 N.E.2d at 280-81. 
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nor its use of the subpoena power was inconsistent with state law, 
but rather that the commission furthered the purposes of the state 
legislation.88 The Worcester ordinance was therefore a valid home 
rule enactment. 
In some instances the Supreme Judicial Court has determined 
that state legislation was intended to pre-empt its subject matter 
from local action.8' Most significant to the issue of wetlands pro-
tection is the court's decision that the legislature intended to oc-
cupy the field of zoning.'o Because of this pre-emption, a munici-
pality may enact zoning by-laws or ordinances only for the 
purposes allowed by the Zoning Act and only by the procedures set 
out in the Zoning Act. It cannot zone under its home rule powers. 
Given this prohibition of home rule zoning, a need arises to de-
fine what a zoning enactment is. More precisely, it is necessary to 
define the limits of the subject matter pre-empted by the Zoning 
Act. For example, can a town enact non-zoning by-laws on subjects 
that could be dealt with through zoning, or must it use zoning pro-
cedures for any subject that could conceivably be dealt with by a 
zoning by-law? 
Clearly, a town must not be able to circumvent the Zoning Act 
simply by stating that its by-laws are all non-zoning and that 
therefore it need not follow zoning procedures. Some municipal en-
actments, such as those regulating the heights of buildings or the 
sizes of lots, are unquestionably zoning enactments and should be 
subject to Zoning Act procedures. Yet, it does not necessarily fol-
low that all land use regulations are zoning enactments. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that earth removal by-
laws, which clearly involve land use, may be adopted pursuant to 
either the earth removal statute or the Zoning Act.·1 Thus to some 
undefined extent, land use can be regulated through non-zoning 
powers. 
The Supreme Judicial Court considered the distinction between 
zoning and non-zoning municipal enactments in Rayeo Investment 
Corp. v. Selectman of Raynham.'t In Rayeo, a corporate land-
.. [d. at 158-60, 293 N.E.2d at 281-83. 
a. E.g., Middlesex & Boston St. Ry. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 371 Mass. 849, 856-57, 359 
N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (1977); Del Duca v. Town Administrator of Methuen, 368 Mass. 1, 329 
N.E.2d 748 (1975); Town of Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 282 N.E.2d 87 (1972). 
to Middlesex & B.S.R. Co. v. Board of Alderman, 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977); 
Town of Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 608, 282 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1972). 
" Byrne v. Town of Middleborough, 364 Mass. 331, 334, 304 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1973) . 
.. 368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). 
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owner in the town of Raynham submitted a proposal to the town 
planning board under which its land would be used as a trailer 
park. A few days later, the town passed a by-law limiting the num-
ber of trailer parks that would be permitted in the town. This by-
law would have been invalid if viewed as a zoning by-law: the 
Zoning Enabling Act provided for a three-year freeze on zoning 
amendments affecting the use of a particular parcel of land once 
the planning board had received a plan for the land's use.93 The 
town, however, claimed that it had authority to regulate trailer 
parks under its independent police powers and that the by-law 
should be viewed as a valid non-zoning application of those 
powers. 
The Supreme Judicial Court decided that the disputed by-law in 
Rayeo should be seen as an amendment to the town zoning by-laws 
and was therefore invalid. 1M It reached this decision primarily be-
cause Raynham already had detailed zoning regulations for trailer 
parks.911 In light of this fact, the court decided: "Whether or not a 
by-law limiting the maximum number of trailer park licenses 
might in some circumstances be grounded in the town's police 
power apart from the zoning power, we nonetheless conclude that 
in this instance the by-law must be viewed as a zoning 
regulation. "98 
The court's conclusion in Rayeo was clearly correct. An unlim-
ited ability of a town to regulate land use under the guise of its 
home rule police powers would effectively circumvent the state 
zoning laws. This is just what the town of Raynham attempted to 
do in the RayeD case. Yet, the RayeD decision was expressly limited 
to the facts of that case. It did not attempt the difficult task of 
.S Act of April 17, 1957, ch. 297, 1957 Mass. Acts 190; as amended by Act of April 27, 
1965, ch. 366, 1965 Mass. Acts 195 . 
.. Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of Raynham, 368 Mass. 385, 393, 331 N.E.2d 910, 
915 (1975) . 
•• The Raynham zoning by-law required the board of health to administer trailer park 
regulations. Board of health approval of a trailer park was based on its consideration (as 
required by the existing zoning by-law) of: detriment to neighborhood character; total num-
ber of parking spaces available for trailers; the percentage of the park devoted to dwelling 
lots; street frontage; minimum lot dimensions; access drives and parking; adequacy and con-
venience of water and electricity; and sewage facilities. Raynham, Mass. By-laws and Zoning 
By-laws, § 1 (1955), Record at 35-37, Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of Raynham, 368 
Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). The zoning by-law did not expressly limit the number of 
trailer parks allowed in the town . 
.. Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of Raynham, 368 Mass. 385, 392, 331 N.E.2d 910, 
914 (1975). 
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drawing an effective line between zoning and non-zoning by-laws. 
As may be seen from the Bloom and Rayco cases, the possible 
use of home rule powers for wetlands protection depends largely 
on the courts' interpretation of the intent behind any existing state 
statutes which treat the subject matter. Faced with a by-law and 
one or more statutes that cover the same subject, the court must 
first determine whether any of the statutes were intended to oc-
cupy the field of the legislation to the exclusion of municipal en-
actments. If no intent to pre-empt exists, the court will follow the 
reasoning of Bloom and consider whether the by-law is consistent 
with the purposes of the state legislation. However, if the court 
finds that one or more of the statutes were intended to pre-empt 
their subject matter, it must still determine the extent of the pre-
emption and decide, as it did in Rayco, whether the by-law falls 
inside or outside of the pre-empted field. This was the basic analy-
sis conducted by the Supreme Judicial Court in Lovequist v. Town 
of Dennis"? 
IV. LOVEQUIST v. CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF 
DENNIS 
A. Background 
In Lovequist the Supreme Judicial Court considered the validity 
of a town by-law which established a permit system for wetlands 
development that substantially paralleled the permit system of the 
Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act.8s Under the Dennis by-
law, any person wishing to alter a wetland must obtain a second 
permit from the town conservation commission in addition to the 
permit required by the Wetlands Protection Act. In deciding 
whether to grant the local permit, the commission is required to 
consider not only whether the proposal will significantly affect 
water supply, ground water, flood control, storm damage, pollution, 
shellfish, or fisheries as required by the Wetlands Protection Act, 
but also whether it would affect erosion, wildlife, recreation, or 
aesthetics.88 If the commission determines that the proposal will 
.. Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of the Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 
393 N.E.2d 858 (1979) . 
.. See text at notes 21-28 supra . 
.. Dennis, Mass. By-laws, art. XV, § 1 (1973). The by-law reads, in relevent part: 
1. The purpose of this by-law is to protect the foreshores and wetlands of the Town of 
Dennis by controlling activities deemed to have a significant effect upon wetland values, 
including but not limited to the following: Public or private water supply, groundwater, 
/ 
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significantly affect one or more of these wetland values, it is em-
powered not only to impose conditions on the proposed work,loo 
but also to prohibit the development.lol This additional power is 
not expressly granted by the Wetlands Protection Act.loa Thus, the 
substantive effect of the Dennis by-law is to broaden the power 
granted to the town conservation commission. 
Procedurally, the notice and hearing requirements of the Wet-
lands Protection Act may be used to satisfy the town by-law. How-
ever, appeal from the commission's decision under a home rule by-
law is directly in Superior COurt,108 skipping the DEQE review pro-
vided for in the Wetlands Protection Act.1N The difference in ap-
peals procedure is significant because under the de novo review of 
the Wetlands Protection Act, the DEQE can substitute its policy 
judgment for that of the local commission even if the commission 
committed no clear error in its decision. The Dennis by-law avoids 
the DEQE review and replaces it with a certiorari appeal to Supe-
rior Court. loa Under certiorari, the court is empowered only to cor-
flood control, erosion control, storm damage, water pollution, fisheries, shellfish, wildlife, 
recreation and esthetics. No person shall remove, fill, dredge, or alter any bank, fresh 
water wetland, coastal wetland, beach, dune, flat, marsh, meadow, bog, swamp, or lands 
bordering on the ocean or on any estuary, creek, river, stream, pond or lake, or any land 
under said waters or any land subject to tidal action, coastal storm flowage, or flooding, 
other than in the course of maintaining, repairing or replacing, but not substantially 
changing or enlarging, an existing and lawfully located structure or faciliity used in the 
service of the public and used to provide electric, gas, water, telephone, telegraph and 
other telecommunication services, without filing written notice of his intention to 80 re-
move, fill, dredge or alter and without receiving and complying with an order of condi-
tions and provided all appeal periods have elapsed. Such notice shall be sent by certified 
mail to the Dennis Conservation Commission, including such plans as may be necessary 
to describe such proposed activity and its effect on the environment. The same notice, 
plans and specifications required to be filed by an applicant under Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 131, Section 40, will be accepted as fulfilling the requirements of this 
by-law. The said Commission, in its discretion, may hear any oral presentation under the 
provisions of said Chapter 131, Section 40, of the Massachusetts General Laws . . . . 
4. The Conservation Commission is empowered to deny permission for any removal, 
dredging, filling, or altering of subject lands within the town if, in its judgment, such 
denial is necessary to preserve environmental quality of either or both the subject lands 
and contiguous lands. Due consideration shall be given to poSsible effects of the proposal 
on all values to be protected under this by-law and to any demonstrated hardship on the 
petitioner by reason of a denial, as brought forth at the public hearing. 
100 [d. MAas. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980). 
101 Dennis, Mass. By-Laws, Article XV, § 4 (1973). See note 99 supra. 
101 See MAss. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980). 
101 See MASS. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 249, § 4 (West Supp. 1980). 
104 MABB. GBN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West Supp. 1980). 
106 MAss. GBN. LAws ANN. ch. 249, § 4 (West Supp. 1980). See note 26 supra. 
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rect substantial legal errors made by the commission. l08 It cannot 
substitute its policy judgment for that of the commission. Thus, a 
conservation commission ruling under the by-law is less likely to 
be overturned than the same decision made under the Wetlands 
Protection Act. The net effect of the by-law is, therefore, not only 
to increase the substantive power of the town conservation com-
mission but also to buttress its authority procedurally. 
The plaintiffs in the Lovequist case were the trustees of land 
located in the town of Dennis. The land consisted of approximately 
fourteen acres of wetland and a "neck" of twenty-six acres of up-
land. The plaintiffs wanted to build a subdivision of single family 
houses on the upland, with an access road to be built over the 
marsh to the upland. Without the proposed road, the only access 
to the upland was an old dirt road which the court found would be 
adequate for one single-family home. Accordingly, a notice of in-
tent was filed with the Dennis conservation commission and hear-
ings were held. The commission denied the application under both 
the town by-law and the Wetlands Protection Act on the basis of 
its finding that the road construction would cause serious ground-
water and water pollution problems. The plaintiffs appealed the 
decision under the Wetlands Protection Act to the DEQE where, 
as of the date of the Lovequist decision, the case was still pending. 
The commission decision under the by-law was appealed to Supe-
rior Court where it was upheld. The case was then transferred to 
the Supreme Judicial Court.107 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Dennis by-law was in-
consistent with both the Wetlands Protection Act and the Zoning 
Enabling Act and was thus an invalid use of the town's home rule 
powers. lOS The plaintiffs' claim of "inconsistency"l08 between the 
, .. See Boston Edison Co. v. Boerd of Selectmen of Concord, 355 Mass. 79, 87, 242 
N.E.2d 868, 873-74 (1968). 
'07 Lovequist v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2211-13, 393 N.E.2d 858, 860-61 
(1979). 
,.. The plaintiffs also argued the issues of bias, lack of substantial evidence, and taking 
without due process of law. They were unsuccessful in these arguments. [d. at 2220-27, 393 
N.E.2d at 864-66. 
The parties argued the Lovequist case under the Zoning Enabling Act, which was in effect 
when the action was originally filed. However, the Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
case and wrote its opinion well after the Zoning Act took effect. (All municipal zoning by-
laws and ordinances enacted prior to 1975 had to be brought into conformity with the Zon-
ing Act provisions by June 30,1978. Act of Dec. 22, 1975, ch. 808 § 5, 1975 Mass. Acts 1112, 
1131-32.) 
In Massachusetts, statutes enacted while litigation is in progress are given retroactive ef-
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by-law and the Wetlands Protection Act was based on the argu-
ment that the legislature had reason for adopting the Act in the 
form in which it was passed. For example, the DEQE review proce-
dure was deliberately employed to safeguard the rights of appli-
cants. The "order of conditions" mechanism was used to promote 
the philosophy that land use can be regulated to some extent but 
cannot be completely denied. Since the Act deliberately employed 
these mechanisms, the plaintiffs reasoned that Dennis should not 
be able to use its home rule powers to re-write the state legislation. 
To allow such re-writing would be inconsistent with the intent of 
the Wetlands Protection Act.no 
The plaintiffs also argued that the Dennis by-law conflicted with 
the Zoning Enabling Act. Their reasoning was that the by-law reg-
ulated land use and was therefore a zoning enactment which had 
to employ zoning procedures. This argument has considerable ap-
peal for two reasons. First, it is clear that the Zoning Enabling Act 
was intended to pre-empt the field of zoning from independent 
municipal action.1l1 Therefore, if the Dennis by-law were substan-
tively a zoning enactment, it must employ the state zoning proce-
dures. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the by-law dealt with a 
subject matter that had to be regulated through zoning. To sup-
port this contention, they pointed to cases such as Turnpike Re-
altylll where the Supreme Judicial Court had upheld wetlands by-
laws passed under the zoning power. Since wetlands protection is 
clearly a permitted zoning purpose, the plaintiffs argued that the 
feet only when the changes for which they provide are procedural. City Council of Waltham 
v. Vinciullo, 364 Mass. 624, 307 N.E.2d 316 (1974). It therefore appears that the Lovequist 
decision was reached under the substantive provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act. This 
quirk of timing raises an interesting question on the authority of Lovequist under the Zon-
ing Act. Since the Zoning Act authorized municipal wetlands zoning in more explicit terms 
than the Zoning Enabling Act (see text at notes 32-49 supra), it is at least arguable that the 
substantive field pre-empted by these two statutes differs. However, it seems unlikely that 
the Supreme Judicial Court will follow such an interpretation of the Zoning Act. The court 
did not distinguish the two statutes in the Lovequist opinion even though the change in the 
law was noted in the plaintiffs' brief. Brief for Plaintiffs at 15-16, Lovequist v. Town of 
Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 393 N.E.2d 855 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' 
Brief). It would be ironic if the legislature'S attempt in the Zoning Act to strengthen the 
authority of a municipality to protects its wetlands were to result in the curbing of munici-
pal home rule powers in the field. See note 132 infra . 
• " See text and notes at notes 71-80 supra. 
110 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 108, at 21-23. 
111 Town of Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 282 N.E.2d 87 (1972). See note 108 supra. 
"" Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). 
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legislature intended municipalities to pass wetlands by-laws and 
ordinances under the zoning power only. To rule otherwise, they 
contended, would be to allow municipalities to circumvent the 
Zoning Enabling Act in a manner which the court had forbidden in 
Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of Raynham. l13 
The Supreme Judicial Court's analysis of the plaintiffs' claims 
under the Wetlands Protection Act and the Zoning Enabling Act 
will be considered separately. 
B. The Dennis By-law and the Wetlands Protection Act 
The Dennis by-law differs from the Massachusetts Wetlands 
Protection Act in three aspects: (1) the wetland values which the 
conservation commission must seek to protect,114 (2) the authoriza-
tion of the commission to limit wetlands development,lltI and (3) 
the appeal procedure.1l8 
In examining the first of these differences for inconsistency, the 
actual holding of the case should be clearly defined. The Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the conservation commission's permit denial 
on the basis of the commission's finding that the proposed con-
struction would cause serious groundwater depletion,117 a value 
which is protected both under the Act and the Dennis by-law. The 
Lovequist decision did not examine the validity of the by-law re-
quirement that the conservation commission consider the effect of 
the proposed development on erosion, wildlife, recreation, and aes-
thetics, i.e., the additional values protected under the by-law but 
not under the Act. However, the Lovequist decision clearly sup-
ports the view that the broadening by the Dennis by-law of the 
wetlands interests which the Wetlands Protection Act requires 
conservation commissions to consider should not be interpreted as 
a conflict with state law. The court emphasized that the by-law 
"furthers-rather than derogates from-the legislative purpose 
embodied in the Wetlands Protection Act"ll8 and reiterated its 
earlier holding that the state wetland statutes set minimum stan-
dards only, leaving municipalities free to adopt more stringent 
110 368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). See Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 108, at 9-21. 
11f See text and notes at note 99 supra. 
110 See text and notes at notes 100-101 supra. 
110 See text and notes at notes 103-106 supra. 
117 Lovequist v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2223-25, 393 N.E.2d 858, 865 
(1979). 
110 [d. at 2219, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
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standards.11I In light of the court's reasoning, it is apparent that 
the addition of interests for conservation commissions to consider 
is a valid exercise of home rule powers.llllO 
The second difference between the Wetlands Protection Act and 
the Dennis by-law is that the by-law expressly authorizes conser-
vation commissions to deny permission to alter a wetland. This 
power was not expressly authorized by the Wetlands Protection 
Act. However, the DEQE regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
Act in fact empower commissions to prohibit harmful develop-
ment.1I1 Given this fact, the court, again stating that the by-law 
merely furthered the purposes of the Wetlands Protection Act 
rather than detracting from them, dismissed the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that this difference between the Wetlands Protection Act 
and the Dennis by-law amounted to an inconsistency.lll 
The final claim of inconsistency was based on the different pro-
cedures for administrative and judicial review. This was perhaps 
the plaintiffs' strongest argument for inconsistency between the 
Dennis by-law and the Wetlands Protection Act due to the signifi-
cant differences between the Act and the by-law. However, the 
court found that the "disparity" in the review procedures did "not 
rise to the level of conflict,"1 •• because the by-law did not deprive 
an aggrieved party of the rights of review available under non-zon-
ing by-laws (i.e. an appeal to Superior Court under certiorari).ll' 
At first, the court's response to this last claim of inconsistency 
may seem inappropriate. The fact that the by-law meets due pro-
cess procedural requirements does not necessarily mean that it is 
consistent with state law. Yet here the court is faced with a proce-
dural "disparity"l" substantial enough for the plaintiffs to argue 
m Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 525, 265 N.E.2d 573, 577 
(1970). See text at notes 35-38 .upra. 
110 The legal soundness of these additional interests as valid purposes for the exercise of 
the police power is a separate issue which the court did not reach in LovequiBt. See text at 
notes 3, 42-50 .upra. There seems to be little doubt that erosion control is a proper police 
power purpose. See MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 512,519, 340 
N.E.2d 487, 492 (1976) (MacGibbon lll). Recreation, wildlife protection, and especially aes-
thetics may encounter diflicultiea with the argument that police power regulation for these 
purposes amounts to a taking of property without compensation. See notes 3 and 42 supra. 
lSI 12 CODB OF MAss. RBo. § 310.06(3) (1978). 
ISS Lovequiat v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2218-19, 393 N.E.2d 858, 863 
(1979). 
1" [d. at 2220, 393 N.E.2d at 864 (1979). 
1M MAss. GBN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 249, § 4 (West Supp. 1980). 
1 .. Lovequiat v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2220, 393 N.E.2d 858, 864 
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that the primary purpose of the by-law is to eliminate the adminis-
trative review provided for in the state Act,128 and its response is 
merely to see if the requirements of minimum procedural due pro-
cess have been met. The answer to this problem may lie in reading 
the court's approach in Lovequist as setting forth a standard for 
determining procedural inconsistency between municipal enact-
ments and state laws which have not occupied the field of their 
subject matter. By requiring no more than procedural due process 
from the Dennis by-law, Lovequist may stand for the proposition 
that procedural differences between home rule by-laws and state 
statutes will not be deemed inconsistencies unless the state statute 
has pre-empted independent local action. 
Such a reading of Lovequist does not conflict with other home 
rule cases. For example, in Bloom the court searched for possible 
inconsistency by asking whether "the State legislative purpose can 
be achieved in the face of a local ordinance or by-law on the same 
subject . . . . "117 Lovequist suggests that the particular procedure 
employed by a state statute will not, in itself, be considered a 
"State legislative purpose" unless the statute has pre-empted the 
field of the legislation. Thus, when the court determined that the 
Wetlands Protection Act did not pre-empt the field but merely set 
minimum standards in an attempt to protect the state's wet-
lands,128 it was holding that a municipality could strengthen those 
minimum standards not only substantively but also procedurally 
so long as minimum due process standards were met. 
C. The Dennis By-law and Massachusetts Zoning 
In addition to the claim of conflict between the Dennis by-law 
and the Wetlands Protection Act, the plaintiffs in Lovequist al-
(1979) . 
.. 8 Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note lOS, at 23. See note 144 infra . 
.. 7 Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 156, 293 N.E.2d 268, 280-81 (1973). In 
other cases the Supreme Judicial Court has stated that a home rule by-law may not frus-
trate either the purpose or the implementation of a state statute. Rayco Investment Corp. 
v. Selectmen of Raynham, 368 Mass. 385, 394, 331 N.E.2d 910, 915 (1975); Board of Appeals 
of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339, 360, 294 N.E.2d 393, 409 (1973). 
The exact significance of this distinction is not clear, and it was not referred to in the Love-
quist decision. The court evidently did not feel that the different procedures under the Den-
nis by-law frustrated the implementation of the Wetlands Protection Act . 
.. 8 Lovequist v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2219, 393 N.E.2d 858, 863 
(1979); Golden v. Selectment of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 526, 265 N.E.2d 573, 577 (1970). 
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leged a conflict with the Zoning Enabling Act.1I1 The argument 
made was that the by-law regulated land use and thus fell within 
the subject area of zoning. The Supreme Judicial Court had previ-
ously held that the legislature, in enacting the Zoning Enabling 
Act, intended to pre-empt the subject of zoning from local by-laws 
and ordinances outside of the Act. lso Therefore, if the Dennis by-
law invaded the subject area of the state zoning law, it would have 
to be found to be inconsistent with the state legislation.181 
Since it is clear that the zoning power includes the power to pass 
by-laws for wetlands and flood plain protection, the question that 
arises is whether a municipality must follow zoning procedures if it 
desires, outside the Wetlands Protection Act, to protect its wet-
lands or if instead it can use its home rule power to act on behalf 
of a purpose which could be reached by zoning.IBI 
The plaintiffs analogized the situation to that of the trailer park 
by-law in Rayco Investment Corp. v. Selectmen of Raynham,!88 
where the court held that the town could not circumvent the pro-
cedures of the Zoning Enabling Act by using home rule powers to 
limit the number of trailer parks in the town. The court in Love-
quist found Rayco "readily distinguishable" because the Dennis 
by-law "manifests neither the purpose nor the effects of a zoning 
regulation."l" As opposed to the situation in Rayco where Rayn-
ham had already enacted "comprehensive"181 zoning regulations 
dealing with trailer parks, the town of Dennis had no history of 
... See text at notes 111-113 supra . 
••• Town of Canton v. Bruno, 361 Mass. 598, 282 N.E.2d 87 (1972). 
II. See note 108 supra. 
... The plaintiffs in Louequist argued that the adoption of the Zoning Act in 1975, along 
with the Act's expressly authorized zoning purposes, clarified the legislative intent to pro-
tect wetlands through zoning as opposed to home rule. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 108, at 
15. The court did not directly respond to this argument in its decision. There is some merit 
in the plaintiffs' contention because chapter 808 of the 1975 Acts did state that "[tlhis act is 
designed to provide standardized procedures for the administration and promulgation of 
municipal zoning laws." Act of Dec. 22, 1975, ch. 808, § 2A, 1975 Mass. Acts 1112, 1114. 
However, the standardization would apply only to zoning by-laws and ordinances and, sig-
nificantly, the Act was also designed to promote the adoption of these zoning by-laws and 
ordinances "in accordance with the provisions of Article 89 of the Amendments to the Con-
stitution and to achieve greater implementation of the powers granted to municipalities 
thereunder." [d. The intent of the Zoning Act was to provide greater protection for wetlands 
but not necessarily to the exclusion of municipal home rule regulation. See note 108 supra . 
... 368 Mass. 385, 331 N.E.2d 910 (1975). See text at notes 92-96 supra . 
... Lovequist v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2217, 393 N.E.2d 858, 862-63 
(1979) • 
... [d. at 2218, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
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wetlands or flood plain zoning. The court also noted that the pur-
pose of this wetlands by-law was clearly to protect wetlands rather 
than to regulate the use of any particular parcel of land. Thus, 
although the court recognized that the by-law affected land use 
through its attempt to protect "wetland values," it declined to con-
clude that municipal regulations which "simply overlap with what 
may be the province of a local zoning authority" must be found to 
be zoning enactments.ue 
It is unclear exactly what lines, if any, the Lovequist decision 
has drawn between zoning and non-zoning by-laws. However, the 
court has obviously concluded that not all by-laws regulating land 
use need be seen as zoning by-laws. As the court mentions, this 
position has precedent in its decisions defining the extent of local 
regulation permissible under the earth removal statute.187 The 
earth removal cases may act as a precedent for home rule by-laws 
and ordinances because they apply similar standards for compati-
bility with state law.118 Specifically, the earth removal statute 
authorizes municipalities to enact only earth removal by-laws and 
ordinances which are "not repugnant to law," while Article 89 au-
thorizes by-laws and ordinances only if "not inconsistent"U8 with 
state law. The court's analysis in Bloom indicates that these two 
standards are substantially the same.140 Therefore, cases deciding 
whether earth removal by-laws are "repugnant" to the state zoning 
law may serve as precedent for cases such as Lovequist where the 
issue is possible "inconsistency" between a home rule by-law and 
the Zoning Enabling Act.141 
Prior to the Lovequist decision, the Supreme Judicial Court had 
held that under the authority of the earth removal statute, towns 
could regulate earth removal without following zoning proce-
dures.141 It had also decided that towns may employ both zoning 
by-laws and non-zoning earth removal by-laws simultaneously. HI 
Since earth removal by-laws usually regulate land use with a per-
mit system similar to that of the Dennis wetlands by-law, the 
'" Id. 
'" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 21 (West Supp. 1980). 
,.. See text at notes 59-65 supra. 
II. MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXIX, § 6. 
, •• Bloom v. City of Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 152-57,293 N.E.2d 268, 278-81 (1973). See 
text at notes 81-88 supra. 
,., See note lOS supra. 
'" Byrne v. Town of Middleborough, 364 Mass. 331, 304 N.E.2d 194 (1973). 
, •• Goodwin v. Hopkinton, 358 Mass. 164, 261 N.E.2d 60 (1970). 
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court's position in Lovequist is at . least consistent with its previous 
holdings. However, this consistency does not explain the court's 
reasoning that although both wetlands and earth removal by-laws 
regulate land use, they are not zoning by-laws. 
An examination of the Lovequist decision suggests that four fac-
tors influenced the court's decision not to interpret the Dennis by-
law as a zoning by-law. First, the town of Dennis, in enacting its 
by-law, clearly intended that it be a non-zoning by-law. This fact 
in itself distinguishes Rayeo, where the town's intent at the time of 
enactment was not clear .144 
Second, Dennis had no history of wetlands zoning. In Rayeo, 
Raynham had a "comprehensive" zoning by-law regulating trailer 
parks, and the court interpreted the disputed by-law as a zoning 
amendment largely because of this fact. In 
Third, although wetlands protection is a purpose for which a 
town may zone, it is not a traditional zoning purpose. Thus the 
court noted that wetland values "do not include air pollution, 
noise, demands for sewers and other municipal services, or the 
character of the community and the compatibility of nearby land 
uses, all typical of the concerns usually reflected in the zoning 
process. "14. 
Fourth, the system of implementation employed by the Dennis 
wetlands by-law differs significantly from that of a typical zoning 
by-law. It does not prohibit or allow, on its face, any particular 
land use. Rather, "it specifies that permission be obtained from the 
conservation commission based on factual circumstances surround-
ing individual applications."I47 Given the clear municipal intent 
that the Dennis by-law be non-zoning, given the lack of any ex-
isting wetlands zoning in Dennis, and given the fact that the by-
law's purposes and implementation differed from traditional zon-
ing purposes and procedures, the court decided that the Dennis 
'" This also follows the COurt'B approach in Goodwin where it looked to municipal intent 
to see if the town zoning by-law voided its earth removal by-law. The COurt'B position W8B 
that the town could choose to adopt earth removal by-laws inatead of or along with zoning 
by-laws because it "may properly desire to have two Beparate ordinances or by-laws to avoid 
the involved and Btrict procedural requirements for adopting or amending zoning ordinances 
and by-laws." Goodwin v. Hopkinton, 358 Mass. 164, 170, 261 N.E.2d 60, 64 (1970). 
... See text at note 95 supra. 
, .. Lovequist v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2217, 393 N.E.2d 858, 863 
(1979). See note 132 supra. 
'47 Lovequist v. Town of Dennis, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2210, 2217, 393 N.E.2d 858, 862 
(1979). 
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by-law was not a zoning by-Iaw.l48 
The Lovequist decision clearly upholds the validity of home rule 
wetlands regulation. However, due to the number of factors influ-
encing the court's decision to interpret the Dennis by-law as non-
zoning, the limits of the holding are not clear. In particular, it is 
debatable whether the court would have reached the same decision 
had Dennis had a history of wetlands zoning prior to enacting the 
disputed by-law. 
The Lovequist court had little trouble distinguishing the wet-
lands by-law in Lovequist from the invalid trailer park by-law in 
the Rayco case because the town in Rayco had a pre-existing by-
law which regulated trailer parks "in a comprehensive fashion. "148 
Thus, under the Lovequist decision, a Massachusetts municipality 
could presumably pass a home rule by-law or ordinance regulating 
wetlands development provided that any pre-existing zoning enact-
ments regulating wetlands were not found to treat the subject 
"comprehensively." Precisely how detailed the pre-existing zoning 
regulation can be before it will be adjudged "comprehensive" is a 
question which only future cases can decide. It is, however, a ques-
tion of more than academic concern. Numerous Massachusetts mu-
nicipalities have passed zoning by-laws and ordinances regulating 
construction on flood plains.110 Although flood plain zoning enact-
ments seek to protect different interests than those by-laws and 
ordinances regulating wetlands development, the two areas of regu-
lation clearly overlap. Whether a town which had engaged in flood 
plain zoning could enact a home rule wetlands by-law without that 
by-law'S being interpreted as an invalid amendment to the existing 
zoning regulations is a significant question which remains to be 
answered. 
Due to the existence of such unanswered questions, home rule 
wetlands regulation must be approached with caution. The Love-
Quist decision is not a panacea for municipalities beleaguered by 
the complexities of zoning. Strictly read, it authorizes the use of 
home rule powers only in limited fact situations. While the holding 
in Lovequist may be broadened in future cases, municipalities con-
sidering employing the home rule approach embodied in the Den-
nis wetlands by-law should first be certain that this approach is 
... [d. at 2218, 393 N.E.2d at 863. 
, •• [d. 
110 See Dawson, Protecting Massachusetts Wetlands, 12 SUFFOLK L. REv. 755 (1978). See 
generally, Dunham Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098 (1959). 
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appropriate given the regulatory needs and history of the individ-
ual town or city. 
It is likely that real estate interests in Massachusetts will criti-
cize the Lovequist decision for upholding an arguably confusing 
system of municipal permit requirements apart from the Wetlands 
Protection and Zoning Acts. This criticism cannot withstand close 
scrutiny. It should be remembered that had the Supreme Judicial 
Court found the Dennis by-law invalid, municipalities could still 
regulate the development of wetlands under the authorization of 
the Zoning Act. Thus, at least to the extent that home rule enact-
ments are used as an alternative to zoning by-laws and ordinances, 
the total number of permits required will not be increased under 
Lovequist. Furthermore, the substantive provisions of zoning by-
laws and ordinances would be no less varied than those of home 
rule enactments. Finally, given the procedural complexities of the 
Zoning Act,1I1 it is difficult to argue that the certiorari appeal from 
the home rule by-law in Lovequist is, in itself, any more compli-
cated than an appeal under the Zoning Act. 
The real heart of any concern about the Lovequist decision lies 
in the fact that by limiting review of local decisions it places more 
authority in the hands of municipalities than was formerly availa-
ble under either the Wetlands Protection Act or the Zoning Ena-
bling Act. The answer to this distrust of local power can only be 
that the Lovequist opinion follows a policy decision made when 
Massachusetts adopted its home rule amendment. Article 89 
grants a constitutional presumption of validity to municipal enact-
ments.lll H local authority is abused, or if its exercise, in the opin-
ion of the state legislature, conflicts with state legislation or policy, 
it is well within the power of the legislature to pre-empt expressly 
the field of legislation from local action. 
Given this construction of home rule in Massachusetts, the re-
sult in Lovequist cannot be faulted. H the legislature deems the 
Dennis wetlands by-law confusing or unwise, it can pre-empt the 
field and prevent any further municipal experimentation in wet-
lands regulation. Therefore, there is no need for the judiciary to 
terminate such experimentation by finding it inconsistent with 
state legislative policy unless the inconsistency is very clear. The 
fact that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court followed this 
101 See text and notes at notes 51-58 supra. 
10. See text at notes 68-74 supra. 
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policy of judicial restraint when it declined to invalidate the Den-
nis home rule wetlands by-law is perhaps the most important as-
pect of the Lovequist decision. 
The Lovequist decision is obviously one reached under Massa-
chusetts constitutional and statutory law. Its primary significance 
is within that state. However, especially in states without the ex-
tensive wetlands legislation found in Massachusetts, a home rule 
approach similar to that found in Lovequist could be of great im-
portance to municipal wetlands protection both substantively and 
procedurally. Under home rule a municipality could conceivably 
supply the wetlands regulation absent at the state level. The feasi-
bility of such an approach will of course depend on the form of 
home rule a state employs and its judicial interpretation within 
that state. Yet, the Lovequist decision should stand as persuasive 
authority from a leading state that a liberal approach to home rule 
environmental protection can be taken without jeopardizing a 
state's authority or its legislation. The recognition of that fact 
would enhance environmental protection throughout the country. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts municipalities have substantial statutory author-
ity to regulate the development of local wetlands. This authority 
exists under the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act, the Zon-
ing Act, and the state earth removal statute. However, each of 
these authorizations has drawbacks. Under the Wetlands Protec-
tion Act the state retains considerable control over local wetlands 
regulation. The Zoning Act is procedurally demanding, and the 
earth removal statute is substantively narrow. Because of these 
drawbacks, municipalities have turned to wetlands regulation 
under their home rule powers. 
In Lovequist v. Conservation Commission of the Town of Den-
nis, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the validity of municipal 
wetlands protection under home rule powers. It decided that a 
home rule wetlands by-law enacted by the town of Dennis was 
neither inconsistent with the Wetlands Protection Act nor with the 
Zoning Enabling Act and was, therefore, not precluded by state 
law. Although the exact scope of this decision is not yet certain, 
the Lovequist decision has opened an important new path for wet-
lands protection at the municipal level. 
